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Q2 1999
''This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. Category:Content April 1999: Kosovo Militants Being Funded by Al-Qaeda and Drugs from Afghanistan An unnamed European intelligence agency secretly reports that al-Qaeda has provided financial support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Documents found on a KLA militant further reveal that he has been smuggling combatants into Kosovo, mostly Saudis with Albanian passports. The report further notes that the KLA is largely financed by drug trafficking, bringing drugs from Afghanistan into Europe with the blessing of the Taliban. 2002, PP. 71-72 Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Kosovo Liberation Army Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Drugs April 1999: CIA Rejects Working with High-Level Taliban Leader Opposed to Bin Laden Mullah Mohammed Khaksar. Amir Shah / Associated Press High-level Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Khaksar secretly meets with CIA officials to explore cooperating with them, but the CIA is not interested. Khaksar had been the Taliban’s intelligence minister, but he recently switched posts to deputy interior minister. He is friends with top Taliban leader Mullah Omar, has thousands of policemen under his command, and has solid links to intelligence sources within the Taliban. He secretly meets with US diplomats Gregory Marchese and Peter McIllwain in Peshawar, Pakistan. Marchese will later confirm the meeting took place. Khaksar says he fears the Taliban has been hijacked by the Pakistani ISI and al-Qaeda. He believes Mullar Omar has fallen under the influence of bin Laden and wants to oust him. Khaksar later claims he told them that he was worried about al-Qaeda because “one day they would do something in the world, but everything would be on the head of Afghanistan.” The diplomats pass his offer to Washington (though it is unknown if it was relayed to high-level officials or not). Khaksar soon receives a letter back rejecting his offer. The letter is later shown to the Associated Press, and states, in part, “We don’t want to make mistakes like we made in the holy war the 1980s. We gave much help and it later went against us.” PRESS, 6/9/2002; GUARDIAN, 6/11/2002 Khaksar later says he did provide the CIA with information on two or three other occasions before 9/11, but it is not known if this takes place before or after this meeting. Starting in 1997, he also keeps a regular secret dialogue with Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban. The Northern Alliance’s foreign minister will note after 9/11 that Khaksar was in “constant contact” with Massoud until 9/11, giving him a steady stream of valuable information. RIDDER, 11/29/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 11/30/2001 After 9/11, the US will show no interest in Khaksar’s intelligence about the Taliban (see Between September 12 and Late November 2001 and February 25, 2002). April 1999: Security at US Chemical Plants Lacking The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry issues a report on the safety of the US’s chemical industry from terror attacks. The report finds that security of American chemical plants ranges from “fair” to “very poor.” Security for chemical shipments is “poor to non-existent.” 2008, PP. 92-93 April 1999: Atta and Alshehhi Seen Near Philippine Flight School The Woodland Park Resort. Woodland Park Resort 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta takes flying lessons in the Philippines and Marwan Alshehhi is with him. They stay at the Woodland Park Resort Hotel near Angeles City, which is about 60 miles north of Manila and near the formerly US controlled Clark Air Base. Victoria Brocoy, a chambermaid at the hotel, will later claim that Atta stayed at the hotel for about a week while he learned to fly ultra-light planes at the nearby Angeles City Flying Club. NEWS, 9/29/2001; GULF NEWS, 10/2/2001 She also says, “He was not friendly. If you say hello to him, he doesn’t answer. If he asks for a towel, you do not enter his room. He takes it at the door.… Many times I saw him let a girl go at the gate in the morning. It was always a different girl.” HERALD TRIBUNE, 10/5/2001 Atta stays with some other men who call him Mohamed. She recalls that one of them is Marwan Alshehhi, who is treated like Atta’s sidekick. However, there are no recollections of Alshehhi going to the nearby flight school. TIMES, 10/2/2001; GULF NEWS, 10/2/2001 She says Atta was hosted by a Jordanian named Samir, who speaks Filipino and runs a travel agency in Manila. She adds that many Arab guests stayed at the hotel between 1997 and 1999, and Samir always accompanied them. Samir denies knowing any of the hijackers. NEWS, 9/29/2001; MANILA TIMES, 10/2/2001; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 10/5/2001 The Philippine military will later confirm that Atta and Alshehhi were at the hotel after finding four other employees who claim to have seen them in 1999. Other locals, such as the manager of a nearby restaurant, also recall seeing them. STAR, 10/1/2001; GULF NEWS, 10/2/2001; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 10/5/2001; ASIA TIMES, 10/11/2001 Atta and/or Alshehhi were seen at the same resort in 1997 (see 1997) and will return to it later in 1999 (see December 1999). A leader of a militant group connected to al-Qaeda later confesses to helping 9/11 hijacker pilots while they were in this area (see Shortly After October 5, 2005). Entity Tags: Victoria Brocoy, Marwan Alshehhi, Samir, Woodland Park Resort Hotel, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Philippine Militant Collusion, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia (April 1999): Radical London Imam Abu Qatada Convicted on Terror Charges in Jordan in Absentia Radical London imam Abu Qatada is convicted in absentia on terrorism charges in Jordan. He is alleged to have masterminded a plot aimed at Western tourists. One bomb was discovered and defused outside the American School in Amman, the other, hidden in a car, exploded outside the Jerusalem Hotel, which is popular with US visitors. The prosecutor claimed that Abu Qatada, who was sentenced to life in prison, was the mastermind. BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 3/16/2004; O'NEILL AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 107-108; TIMES (LONDON), 4/15/2008 There were also to be bombs placed under the cars of a former intelligence chief and a former minister of the interior. PRESS, 4/15/2005 Abu Qatada will also be convicted in connection with the Millennium Plot in Jordan later this year (see November 30, 1999). However, he will deny the charges, saying: “Jordan discovers every year or two nothing but organizations claiming that they wanted to cause explosions and destruction. It was proven later that the explosions inside the cinema were unfortunately the work of some intelligence officers to cause confusion.” 11/29/2001 Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohamed Jamal Khalifa was deported from the US to Jordan in 1995 (see April 26-May 3, 1995), but Abu Qatada, who will be arrested in Britain in 2002 (see October 23, 2002), will still not have been deported to Jordan many years later, due to a drawn-out legal battle over his extradition. Entity Tags: Abu Qatada Category Tags: Abu Qatada, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism April 1999-August 1999: FBI Asks Al-Marabh about Two Associates Nabil al-Marabh will claim in a 2002 statement that in May 1999, the FBI approaches him in Boston, looking for Raed Hijazi. Al-Marabh will say he lied and said he did not know Hijazi, even though he knew him well. Hijazi apparently has not been involved in any violent crime yet, but will participate in a failed attempt to bomb a hotel in Jordan (see November 30, 1999) and will help plan the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 (see October 12, 2000). POST, 9/4/2002 In August 1999 FBI agents again visit al-Marabh’s Boston apartment to ask him about another man. Al-Marabh’s wife will later recall that the first name of this man is Ahmed. YORK TIMES, 10/14/2001 He is from Jordan and had lived in their apartment for two months. YORK TIMES, 9/21/2001 Around the same time, the Boston FBI is looking for another associate of al-Marabh’s, Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi (see 1997 and 1999). They work at the same taxi company and fought together in Afghanistan. Entity Tags: Nabil al-Marabh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Raed Hijazi, Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Nabil Al-Marabh April 1, 1999: Hijacker Jarrah Photographs Wedding Party; Informer Later Identifies Most Men Shown in Photograph Friends of Ziad Jarrah taken on April 1, 1999. Third from left in back row is Abdelghani Mzoudi; fifth is Mounir El Motassadeq; seventh is Ramzi bin al-Shibh; Mohamed Atta is on middle row far right; Atta rests his hands on Mohammed Raji. DDP/ AFP (click image to enlarge) Ziad Jarrah has an unofficial wedding with his girlfriend, Aysel Senguen. Interestingly, a photo apparently taken by Jarrah at the wedding is found by German intelligence several days after 9/11. An undercover agent will be able immediately to identify 10 of the 18 men in the photo, as well as where it was taken: the prayer room of Hamburg’s Al-Quds mosque. He is also able to identify which of them attended Mohamed Atta’s study group. He knows even “seemingly trivial details” of some of the men, showing that “probably almost all members of the Hamburg terror cell” have been watched by German state intelligence since this time, if not before. The head of the state intelligence had previously maintained that they knew nothing of any of these men. ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FRANKFURT), 2/2/2003 Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Germany April 2, 1999: Bosnian Muslim Army Caught Smuggling Weapons to KLA in Kosovo The US State Department temporarily suspends cooperation between the Bosnian army and the US private mercenary company MPRI. No official reason is given, but media reports indicate that the Bosnian Muslims being trained by MPRI were caught sending weapons to Muslim rebels in the regions of Kosovo and Sandzak in Serbia. Supposedly, millions of dollars of weapons were smuggled to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo. 4/5/1999; PROGRESSIVE, 8/1/1999; CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 10/28/2002 Entity Tags: US Department of State, Bosnian army, Kosovo Liberation Army, Military Professional Resources Inc. Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans April 3, 1999: Candidate Hijacker Denied US Visa in Yemen Sarbarz Mohammed / Sam Malkandi. Public domain via Seattle Post-Intelligencer Al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash unsuccessfully applies for a US visa in Sana’a, Yemen. His application, which is made under the alias Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf, is denied because he fails to submit sufficient documentation in support of it. Three actual hijackers obtain US visas in Saudi Arabia on the same day and shortly after (see April 3-7, 1999). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 492 Already Known to US Intelligence - Bin Attash is already known to the US intelligence community at this point (see Summer 1999), at least partly because he briefed Mohamed al-Owhali, one of the 1998 African embassy bombers who was captured after the attack, and helped him make a martyrdom video in Pakistan. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/9/1998 The US will begin to associate this alias with terrorist activity no later than early 2000, when bin Attash uses it to take a flight with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who are under US and allied surveillance at that point (see January 8, 2000). However, the alias will not be watchlisted by the US until August 2001 (see August 23, 2001). Apparently, when the US learns the alias is associated with terrorism there is no check of visa application records, and this application and the fact it was made by an al-Qaeda leader will not be discovered until after 9/11 (see After January 8, 2000, After December 16, 2000, and After August 23, 2001). US Contact - On the application, bin Attash gives his reason for going to the US as getting a new prosthesis for his missing leg, and he says Bothell, Washington State, is his final destination. Bin Attash’s contact in Bothell is a man named Sarbarz Mohammed. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 155-6, 492 Mohammed contacts a clinic in the area and speaks to bin Attash once on the phone, but bin Attash says the new leg would cost too much and hangs up. Mohammed, who will later change his name to Sam Malkandi, will deny knowing bin Attash was a terrorist and say that he thought he was just helping a friend of a friend. However, he will later admit lying on his green card application and be arrested in 2005. POST-INTELLIGENCER, 10/17/2005 Entity Tags: Tawfiq bin Attash, Sarbarz Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit April 3-7, 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Obtain US Visas Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar’s US visas. FBI (click image to enlarge) 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar obtain US visas through the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi are already “al-Qaeda veterans” and battle-hardened killers. Almihdhar’s visa is issued on April 7, and he can thereafter leave and return to the US multiple times until April 6, 2000. 8/13/2003 Nawaf Alhazmi gets the same kind of visa; details about Salem are unknown. All three men have indicators in their passports marking them as Islamist radicals (see March 21, 1999, April 4, 1999, and April 6, 1999). These indicators are used to track them by the Saudi authorities, but are apparently not noticed by US officials. COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 The CIA claims the hijackers then travel to Afghanistan to participate in “special training” with at least one other suicide bomber on a different mission. The training is led by Khallad bin Attash, who applies for a US visa on April 3 from Yemen, but fails to get one (see April 3, 1999). The CIA will learn about Almihdhar’s visa in January 2000 (see January 2-5, 2000). The Jeddah Consulate records the fact that Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi obtain US visas a couple of days before Almihdhar, but apparently these records are never searched before 9/11. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 Entity Tags: US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office, Tawfiq bin Attash, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit After Early April 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Leave Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi leave Saudi Arabia after obtaining new passports and US visas there (see March 21, 1999, April 4, 1999, April 6, 1999, and April 3-7, 1999). According to the 9/11 Commission, their passports contain an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 According to author James Bamford, the indicator is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” 2008, PP. 58-59 The Saudi government reportedly uses this indicator to track some of the Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi apparently return to Afghanistan to discuss an attack on the US. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 155 Salem Alhazmi’s destination is unknown. He will be reported to be in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and Afghanistan (see Summer 2000) the next year. Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi are placed on the Saudi terrorist watch list later this year (see Late 1999). Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers April 4, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Salem Alhazmi Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi receives a new passport from Saudi Arabia. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 40 According to the 9/11 Commission, the passport contains an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 According to author James Bamford, this is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” 2008, PP. 58-59 Alhazmi will use the passport to obtain a US visa the same day (see April 3-7, 1999). The Saudi government will reportedly use this indicator to track Alhazmi and other Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers April 6, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar receives a new passport from Saudi Arabia. According to the 9/11 Commission, the passport contains an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 According to author James Bamford, this is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” 2008, PP. 58-59 Presumably, this indicator is placed there because Almihdhar is on the Saudi government watch list at this point due to his radical ties (see Late 1999). The Saudi government will reportedly use this indicator to track Almihdhar and other Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). April 15, 1999: Hanjour Gets Pilot’s License despite Dubious Skills A photocopy of Hani Hanjour’s 1999 pilot license. FBI (click image to enlarge) When Hani Hanjour attended flight schools between 1996 and 1998 he was found to be a “weak student” who “was wasting our resources” (see October 1996-December 1997), and when he tried using a flight simulator, “He had only the barest understanding what the instruments were there to do.” (see 1998) Yet, on this day, he is certified as a multi-engine commercial pilot by Daryl Strong in Tempe, Arizona. Strong is one of many private examiners independently contracted with the FAA. A spokesperson for the FAA’s workers union will later complain that contractors like Strong “receive between $200 and $300 for each flight check. If they get a reputation for being tough, they won’t get any business.” Hanjour’s new license allows him to begin passenger jet training at other flight schools, despite having limited flying skills and an extremely poor grasp of English. AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 4/25/2002; GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 6/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/13/2002 At the next flight school Hanjour will attend in early 2001, the staff will be so appalled at his lack of skills that they will repeatedly contact the FAA and ask them to investigate how he got a pilot’s license (see January-February 2001). After 9/11, the FBI will appear to investigate how Hanjour got his license and question and polygraph the instructor who signed off on his flying skills. The Washington Post will note that, since Hanjour’s pilot skills were so bad, the issue of how he was able to get a license “remains a lingering question that FAA officials refuse to discuss.” POST, 10/15/2001; CBS NEWS, 5/10/2002 After gaining the license, Hanjour apparently returns to the Middle East. He will arrive back in the US in December 2000 (see (Early 2000-November 2000) and December 8, 2000). Entity Tags: Daryl Strong, Hani Hanjour Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Hani Hanjour, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training, Phoenix Memo April 27, 1999: Sen. Lieberman Says US and KLA ‘Stand for the Same Human Values and Principles’ Speaking in front of a small public rally in Washington in favor of an independent Kosovo, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D) says that the “United States of America and the Kosovo Liberation Army stand for the same human values and principles.… Fighting for the KLA is fighting for human rights and American values.” POST, 4/28/1999 Entity Tags: Kosovo Liberation Army, Joseph Lieberman Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans Late April 1999: CIA Secretly Works with KLA During Kosovo War The US-led NATO alliance begins bombing Serbia in March, pressuring it to withdraw from Kosovo, which is part of Serbia but ethnically dominated by Albanians (see March 24, 1999). During the war, the US publicly denies working with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the dominant political group in Kosovo. However, it will later be revealed that the CIA works closely with the KLA, starting at least from late April 1999. At that time, the CIA and US Special Forces troops begin working with the KLA to defeat the Serbians. The KLA passes on useful information about Serbian positions, allowing NATO forces to bomb them. But since the KLA has a reputation for drug running, civilian atrocities, and links to al-Qaeda, the US military generally uses the Albanian army as an intermediary. KLA representatives meet daily with Albanian military officers in Albania, but CIA and US Army officers are usually present as well. In addition, there is a secret NATO operations center in the town of Kukes, Albania, near the border with Kosovo. Most of the KLA liaison work takes place there. US officials begin considering using the KLA as a light-infantry force if NATO needs to invade Kosovo with ground troops. But the war ends in June 1999 before that becomes necessary (see June 9, 1999). POST, 9/19/1999 The same month that the CIA begins working closely with the KLA, a European intelligence report indicates the KLA is being funded by al-Qaeda and drugs from Afghanistan (see April 1999). Entity Tags: Kosovo Liberation Army, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United States Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics May 1999: US Intelligence Provides bin Laden’s Location; CIA Fails to Strike US intelligence obtains detailed reporting on where bin Laden is located for five consecutive nights. CIA Director Tenet decides against acting three times, because of concerns about collateral damage and worries about the veracity of the single source of information. Frustration mounts. Mike Scheuer, head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, writes to a colleague in the field, “having a chance to get Laden three times in 36 hours and foregoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry…” 2004, PP. 450; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 140 An unnamed senior military officer later complains, “This was in our strike zone. It was a fat pitch, a home run.” However, that month, the US mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, due to outdated intelligence. It is speculated Tenet was wary of making another mistake. MONTHLY, 12/2004 There is one more opportunity to strike bin Laden in July 1999, but after that there is apparently no intelligence good enough to justify considering a strike. COMMISSION, 3/24/2004 Entity Tags: Michael Scheuer, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden May 1999: Al-Qaeda Recruiting Sergeant Arrives in London, Links up with British Informer and Radical Imam Abu Hamza A top al-Qaeda operative known as Abu Doha arrives in London to take up a leading role in operations there. French intelligence chief Pierre de Bousquet de Florian will describe Abu Doha, an Algerian better known as “the Doctor,” as al-Qaeda’s main recruiting sergeant in Europe, adding that “it is not possible to over-emphasize his importance” because he is the “principal catalyst” for the establishment of a network of North African radicals across Britain, Europe, and North America. Abu Doha, who has already established a special section for North African trainees at the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan, links up with Abu Hamza al-Masri, a local militant leader and radical imam who is an informer for the British authorities (see Early 1997). He bases himself at Abu Hamza’s mosque, Finsbury Park, where he unifies rival Algerian factions, increasing the flow of funds and recruits sent to the camps in Afghanistan. After he is captured (see February 2001), a British judge at an immigration appeals tribunal will say: “In Afghanistan he had held a senior position in the training camps organizing the passage of mujaheddin volunteers to and from those camps. He had a wide range of extremist Islamic contacts inside and outside Britain including links to individuals involved in terrorist operations. He was involved in a number of extremist agendas. By being in Britain he had brought cohesion to Algerian extremists based here and he had strengthened the existing links with individuals associated with the terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 116-117 Entity Tags: Finsbury Park Mosque, Abu Doha, Abu Hamza al-Masri Category Tags: Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism May 1999: New Owner with ‘Checkered History’ Takes Over Flight School Later Attended by 9/11 Hijackers Huffman Aviation. FBI Huffman Aviation, the Venice, Florida flight school later attended by Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi (see July 1-3, 2000) is sold to Naples-based flight school Ambassador Airways, which is owned by Wally Hilliard and Rudi Dekkers. Although Hilliard finances the purchase, Dekkers becomes the sole stockholder. Dekkers is a Dutch national with a highly questionable past. The St. Petersburg Times will later comment, he “seems to have benefited from the same type of casual scrutiny of visa applicants that let the 9/11 hijackers live and train here the US.” Even before 9/11, he has “a long history of troubled businesses, run-ins with the Federal Aviation Administration and numerous lawsuits… It is the kind of checkered history, experts say, that should have raised questions both before and after the 9/11 attacks about Dekkers’ fitness to run a school that trained pilots.” Having previously run a computer company in the Netherlands that went bankrupt, he’d moved to Naples, Florida in 1992. After running a computer chip exporting company, he’d started Ambassador Airways. Yet he’d been so late on some of his bills there that at one point the Naples airport refused to sell him aviation fuel, even if he paid cash. At some point in 1999 the FAA revoked his pilot’s license for 45 days—a severe penalty—for several violations, including “operating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner.” In spite of Dekkers’ dubious history and the fact that his Ambassador Airways is struggling, Wally Hilliard, a prominent retired businessman, loans him $1.7 million to buy Huffman Aviation. Dekkers says he plans spending $60,000 per year promoting the school, advertising extensively in Germany and other European countries. GONDOLIER SUN, 5/29/1999; VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 1/25/2003; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/25/2004 Huffman Aviation is just up the road from Florida Flight Training Center, where Ziad Jarrah, the alleged pilot of Flight 93, will begin flying lessons in summer 2000 (see (June 28-December 2000)). PRESS, 9/9/2002 Dekkers will close Ambassador Airways in December 2001, due to financial difficulties, and sell Huffman Aviation in January 2003. DAILY NEWS, 1/25/2003; SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 1/28/2003 Entity Tags: Ambassador Airways, Rudi Dekkers, Wally Hilliard, Huffman Aviation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training (May 1999): Control of London-Based Algerian Informer Passed to British Intelligence Service Reda Hassaine, an Algerian informer working for the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch against Islamist extremists in London, is passed to MI5, Britain’s domestic intelligence service. One of his tasks is to identify men who attend Finsbury Park mosque, a hotbed of radicalism, in photographs MI5 gives him. For the first six-month trial period, Hassaine is given £300 (equivalent of $450) per month plus £80 for expenses, but MI5 tells him to claim unemployment and housing benefit as well, “because, after all, we were dealing with the security of the country,” and “it would be a good cover story because everyone in Finsbury Park was foreign and on benefits.” In return for his work, Hassaine is promised he will obtain indefinite leave to remain in Britain, but in February 2000 he will only receive leave to remain for four years, which he will be unhappy about. AND MCGRORY, 2006, PP. 138-9, 147-148 Entity Tags: Finsbury Park Mosque, UK Security Service (MI5), Reda Hassaine Category Tags: Reda Hassaine, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism May 18, 1999: Ali Mohamed Indicted After Secret Talks Fail Ali Mohamed’s booking photo. Peter Lance It is reported that after eight months of secret negotiations between US prosecutors and Ali Mohamed, talks have broken down. Prosecutors had been attempting to get Mohamed to cooperate and tell all that he knows about al-Qaeda in return for a lighter sentence. YORK TIMES, 5/18/1999 Mohamed will later plead guilty to five counts of conspiracy (see October 20, 2000), but will never be publicly sentenced. There will be speculation that he eventually does agree to some secret deal (see July 2001-December 2001). Entity Tags: Ali Mohamed Category Tags: Ali Mohamed May 18, 1999: Potential Al-Qaeda Sleeper Pilot Arrested in Florida; Later Disappears into US Custody Ihab Ali Nawawi. FBI Ihab Ali Nawawi is arrested in Orlando, Florida. He is considered an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa. Nawawi’s family moved from Egypt to the US in the late 1970’s and he graduated from an Orlando high school. He fought in Afghanistan in the 1980’s and helped bin Laden move to Sudan in 1991. Nawawi received a commercial pilot’s license from Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, in 1993. He crashed an airplane owned by bin Laden in 1995 on a runway in Khartoum, Sudan (see Early 1993). He lived in Sudan until 1996 when he moved back to Orlando. Nawawi’s role in al-Qaeda is revealed days after the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa when Ali Mohamed’s residence in California is raided. A letter from Nawawi is discovered asking Mohamed to give his “best regards to your friend Osama”(see August 24, 1998). Nawawi’s connection to the embassy bombings were possibly discovered months earlier, because there were a series of phone calls in 1997 between an Orlando telephone owned by Nawawi’s sister and an al-Qaeda safe house in Nairobi, Kenya. Many telephone numbers connected to that house were being monitored by US intelligence at the time. Given his obvious al-Qaeda ties, it is not clear why agents waited until May 1999 before arresting Nawawi. He is questioned in front of a grand jury, but prosecutors say he is lying and he refuses to talk anymore. FBI agents will visit the Airman Flight School in September 1999 to enquire about his attendance there (see September 1999). He will remain jailed and in September 2000 is finally charged for contempt and perjury. In October 2001, the St. Petersburg Times will report, “There are signs that Ali’s resolve might now be weakening. Court records indicate that Ali’s lawyers seemed to reach an understanding with the government in March 2001. Since that time, all documents in the case have been filed under seal.” PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/28/2001 In May 2002, three full years after his arrest, the New York Times will report that “Nawawi remains in federal custody even now, although he has not been charged with conspiring in the embassy bombing.” YORK TIMES, 5/18/2002 As of the end of 2005, there appears to be no further news on what has happened to Nawawi, and no sign of any trial. When Nawawi is arrested, he is working as a taxi driver. At this time Al-Qaeda operative Nabil al-Marabh is working as a taxi driver about 80 miles away in Tampa, Florida, and while the similarity is intriguing, there is no known reported connection between the two men (see February 1999-February 2000). PETERSBURG TIMES, 10/28/2001 Entity Tags: Ihab Ali Nawawi Category Tags: Warning Signs, 1998 US Embassy Bombings, Ali Mohamed May 23, 1999: FBI Connects Hambali to Bojinka Front Company It has been widely assumed in media reports that US intelligence did not connect al-Qaeda leader Hambali to the Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995) before 9/11. However, the 9/11 Commission will mention in a footnote, “Hambali also was one of the founders of Konsonjaya, a Malaysian company run by close associate of Wali Khan Shah. FBI report, Manila air investigation, May 23, 1999.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 489 The Christian Science Monitor will later note, “Konsonjaya was not just supplying money. It also coordinating the Bojinka plotters” (see June 1994). SCIENCE MONITOR, 2/14/2002 In the spring of 1995, Philippine Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza gave the US a chart he made of the Bojinka plotters, and Konsonjaya was centrally featured in it (see Spring 1995). He later said, “It was sort of their nerve center.” SCIENCE MONITOR, 2/14/2002 Shortly after Ramzi Yousef’s Manila apartment was broken into, documents found there connected Konsonjaya with the “Ladin International” company in Sudan, an obvious bin Laden front. An FBI memo at the time noted the connection. 2003, PP. 303 Hambali’s photograph was also found on Yousef’s computer. STRAITS TIMES, 2/2/2002 In 1996, the company’s records were introduced as evidence in a public trial of some Bojinka plotters, and in 1998, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was nearly caught in Brazil while using Konsonjaya as his business cover (see June 1998). So it’s not clear why it took the FBI four years to learn about Hambali, but that still means they were aware of who he was prior to the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia attended by Hambali and two 9/11 hijackers (see January 5-8, 2000). But apparently the connection will not be made. Entity Tags: Wali Khan Amin Shah, Konsonjaya, Hambali, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ramzi Yousef, Ladin International Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot, Hambali, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Ramzi Yousef, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia Summer 1999: US Intelligence Links Zammar to Senior Bin Laden Operatives, Fails to Share Information Around this time, US intelligence notes that a man in Hamburg, Germany, named Mohammed Haydar Zammar is in direct contact with one of bin Laden’s senior operational coordinators. Zammar is an al-Qaeda recruiter with links to Mohamed Atta and the rest of the Hamburg terror cell. The US had noted Zammar’s terror links on “numerous occasions” before 9/11. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 However, apparently the US does not share their information on Zammar with German intelligence. Instead, the Germans are given evidence from Turkey that Zammar is running a travel agency as a terror front in Hamburg. In 1998, they get information from Italy confirming he is an Islamic militant. However, his behavior is so suspicious that they have already started monitoring him closely. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ; STERN, 8/13/2003 Entity Tags: Turkey, Mohamed Atta, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Germany, Italy Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Al-Qaeda in Italy Summer 1999: CIA Decides to Increase Ties with Northern Alliance, Decision Pushed through by Counterterrorist Center The CIA decides to increase its links with Ahmed Shah Massoud, an Afghan commander fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. The decision is pushed through by Cofer Black, head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, and Richard Blee, head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. According to author Steve Coll, Black and Blee see Massoud “as his admirers in Europe do, as an epochal figure, extraordinarily skillful and determined,” and believe that Massoud is the key to capturing bin Laden. However, the CIA’s Near East Division is skeptical of the potential for this liaison, partly because they remember problems they had with Massoud during the Soviet-Afghan War. Near East officers also think Massoud can only be of limited usefulness against bin Laden because of the geographical distance between Massoud’s forces in the north of Afghanistan and bin Laden’s base in the country’s south. 2004, PP. 460-1 The CIA will soon send more personnel into Afghanistan to meet Massoud and discuss co-operation (see October 1999). However, a plan to make the increase substantial will be rejected in late 2000 and Massoud will still not be receiving much aid by 9/11 (see December 20, 2000). Entity Tags: Rich B., Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Alec Station, Counterterrorist Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden Summer 1999: Bin Laden Makes Secret Deal with Government of Yemen In early 1999, al-Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash is sent to Yemen to help al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri obtain explosives to bomb a ship, and also to get a US visa so he can travel to the US to take part in an operation there. Three 9/11 hijackers get a US visa around this time (see April 3-7, 1999), but bin Attash has more trouble, apparently because he is Yemeni and the others are Saudi. While there, bin Attash is arrested by Yemeni authorities. Bin Laden finds out about the arrest and is concerned that bin Attash might reveal the ship bombing and US operations while under interrogation. Bin Laden contacts a Yemeni official and makes a deal, offering not to attack Yemen if the Yemeni government does not confront him and releases bin Attash in the summer of 1999. Both sides agree to the deal and bin Attash returns to Afghanistan without revealing either plot. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 155-156 There is other evidence Yemeni officials will help al-Nashiri, as his ship attack plot eventually targets the USS Cole while stationed in Yemen (see April 2000 and After October 12, 2000). Entity Tags: Yemen, Osama bin Laden, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Tawfiq bin Attash Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Yemeni Militant Collusion June 1999: CIA Appoints New Chief of Bin Laden Unit; His Management Style Is Not Popular Following the firing of Michael Scheuer, the founding head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit (see June 1999), a new chief of the station is appointed. The chief, Richard Blee, worked in Algeria as a case officer during the civil war there in the early 1990s (see January 11, 1992) and prior to his appointment as station chief was an executive assistant to CIA management. 2004, PP. 456 He also served on an Iraqi task force attempting to destabilize Saddam Hussein’s regime in the mid-1990s. 1/28/2007 According to author Steve Coll: “Since he came directly from Director George Tenet’s leadership group, his arrival was seen as a signal of renewed high-level interest in the bin Laden case. The new chief’s connections presumably would help attract resources to the cause and smooth decision-making.” In addition, “He knows the bin Laden issue, he knows the Third World and he does not mind high-risk travel.” Criticism of Management Style - However, Blee’s management style will attract some criticism. Coll will say that he is “intense and sometimes emotional and combative” and that he is seen by some colleagues as “typical of the unyielding zealots” at Alec Station. 2004, PP. 456, 540 Author James Bamford will comment, “But the most serious problem was Blee‘s lack of management, his myopic obsession with bin Laden, and his focus on the fun and adventure part of the job.” 2004, PP. 218-9 Journalist Ken Silverstein will say: “Sources have told me that Blee has frequently been divisive and ineffective in previous positions.… His reputation and relationship with the military, especially the special-ops community, is very bad, based on substantive issues that arose during his time Afghanistan and Pakistan post-9/11.… Another former official called Blee a ‘smart guy‘…, but described him as a terrible manager.” 1/28/2007 Entity Tags: Rich B., Ken Silverstein, Steve Coll, Central Intelligence Agency, James Bamford, Alec Station Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics June 1999: US Fails to Get Saudis to Act Against Al-Qaeda Financiers Richard Newcomb. Scott Ferrell/ Getty Images The US has been pressuring the Saudi government to do more to stop Saudi financing for al-Qaeda and other militant groups, but so far little has been accomplished (see August 20, 1998-1999). Vice President Al Gore contacts the Saudis and arranges for some US officials to have a meeting with their top security and banking officials. William Wechsler from the National Security Council (NSC), Richard Newcomb from the Treasury Department, and others on an NSC al-Qaeda financing task force meet about six senior Saudi officials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. One US official will later recall, “We laid everything out—what we knew, what we thought. We told them we’d just had two of our embassies blown up and that we needed to deal with them in a different way.” But the Saudis have virtually no oversight over their charities and do not seem interested in changing that. Newcomb threatens to freeze the assets of certain groups and individuals if the Saudis do not crack down. The Saudis promise action, but nothing happens. A second visit by a US delegation in January 2000 is ineffective as well. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 12/15/2003 Entity Tags: William Wechsler, Al Gore, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, Richard Newcomb Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing June 1999: Enron Plans Power Plant with Bin Laden Family Enron announces an agreement to build a $140 million power plant in the Gaza Strip, between Israel and Egypt. One of the major financiers for the project is the Saudi Binladin Group, a company owned by bin Laden’s family. This is the second attempted project between these two companies. Ninety percent complete, the construction will be halted because of Palestinian-Israeli violence and then Enron’s bankruptcy. POST, 3/2/2002 Entity Tags: Saudi Binladin Group, Enron Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, Bin Laden Family June 1999: Bin Laden Wants All US Males Killed In an interview with an Arabic-language television station, bin Laden steps up his rhetoric and issues a further threat indicating that all US males should be killed. 12/11/2001 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Warning Signs June 1999: CIA Fires Bin Laden Unit Chief, But He Refuses to Resign from Agency Michael Scheuer. Publicity photo CIA Director George Tenet removes Michael Scheuer as head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. Scheuer had headed the unit since its inception in 1996, and was known as a strong advocate for more government action against bin Laden. The full name of the new head of the unit has not been released and little is known about his performance. FAIR, 11/2004 Deputy Director of Operations Jack Downing tells Scheuer he is being fired because he is “mentally burned out” and because of a recent disagreement with the FBI over whether the deputy chief of Alex Station, who was detailed to the CIA from the FBI, could release information to the FBI without Scheuer’s approval. Downing tells Scheuer he was in the right, but that the criticism of his subordinate “should not have been put on paper”, and the FBI’s management is angry with him. Downing says he will get a medal and a monetary award, but should tell his subordinates he has resigned. Scheuer refuses to lie to his officers, signs a memo saying he will not accept a monetary award, and tells Downing “where he should store the medal.” 2005, PP. 263-4; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 313 According to author Steve Coll, Scheuer’s CIA colleagues “could not be sure exactly Scheuer left but among at least a few of them a believe settled in that he had been exiled, in effect, for becoming too passionate about the bin Laden threat…” In particular, he was angry about two recent missed opportunities (see 1997-May 29, 1998 and February 11, 1999) to assassinate bin Laden. 2004, PP. 449-450 Scheuer will write in 2004 that, “On moving to a new position, I forwarded a long memorandum to the Agency’s senior-most officers—some are still serving—describing an array of fixable problems that were plaguing America’s attack on bin Laden, ones that the bin Laden unit had encountered but failed to remedy between and among intelligence agencies… The problems outlined in the memorandum stood in the way of attacking bin Laden to the most effective extent possible; many remain today.” Problems include poor cooperation between agencies and a lack of experienced staff working on the bin Laden issue. Scheuer never receives a response to his memo. MONTHLY, 12/2004 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Jack Downing, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Scheuer, Alec Station Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden June-July 1999: CIA Reports that Bin Laden Plans Attack in US In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in a briefing to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staffers one month later, the chief of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center describes reports that bin Laden and his associates are planning attacks in the US. CONGRESS, 9/18/2002 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorist Center Category Tags: Warning Signs Summer 1999: NSA Intercepts More of Almihdhar’s Calls The NSA intercepts more calls (see Early 1999) involving Khalid Almihdhar, who is at an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, with his family (see Late August 1998). The identity of the person he is talking to and the content of the intercepts is so sensitive that the whole passage regarding these communications is redacted in the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s report. After the redacted passage, the Inquiry comments, “At about the same time, the name al-Qaeda leader Khallad Attash came to the attention of the NSA for the first time,” so the calls may involve bin Attash in some way. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 155-6 Almihdhar is staying at the communications hub at this time and will stay there later as well (see (Mid-June-Mid-July 2000) and Late October 2000-July 4, 2001). Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Tawfiq bin Attash Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub June 7, 1999: Bin Laden Finally Makes FBI’s 10 Most Wanted A US wanted poster for bin Laden, highlighting the African embassy bombings and a $5 million reward. US State Department The FBI puts bin Laden on its “10 Most Wanted List.” This is almost a year and a half after bin Laden’s “declaration of war” against the US on February 22, 1998 (see February 22, 1998), and about six months after the CIA’s “declaration of war against al-Qaeda” in December 1998 (see December 4, 1998). It is also three years after an internal State Department document connected bin Laden to financing and planning numerous terrorist attacks. FRONTLINE, 10/3/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics June 8, 1999: New York Emergency Command Center Opened in WTC Building 7 Giuliani’s emergency command center. CNN New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani opens a $13 million emergency command center on the 23rd floor of World Trade Center Building 7. 9/12/2001 The center is intended to coordinate responses to various emergencies, including natural disasters like hurricanes or floods, and terrorist attacks. The 50,000 square foot center has reinforced, bulletproof, and bomb-resistant walls, its own air supply and water tank, beds, showers to accommodate 30 people, and three backup generators. It also has rooms full of video monitors from where the mayor can oversee police and fire department responses. It is to be staffed around the clock and is intended as a meeting place for city leaders in the event of an act of terrorism. 6/7/1999; LONDON TIMES, 9/12/2001; GLANZ AND LIPTON, 2004, PP. 233 The center is ridiculed as “Rudy’s bunker.” 12/22/2001 Author Philip Shenon will later comment that it “seemed the supreme example of how Giuliani’s ego and arrogance knew no bounds after four years in office,” and: “WABC Radio mocked Giuliani with a name-that-bunker contest for its listeners. Among the most popular entries: ‘Rudy’s Nuclear Winter Palace’ and ‘The Nut Shell.’” It is criticized because of the cost and because of the location, next to the WTC towers, one of the city’s top terrorist targets. In addition, the high floor it is on means it is vulnerable to power, water, and elevator outages. 2008, PP. 346-347 Most controversial is the 6,000-gallon fuel tank. In 1998 and 1999, Fire Department officials warn that the fuel tank violates city fire codes and poses a hazard. According to one Fire Department memorandum, if the tank were to catch fire it could produce “disaster.” Building 7 will be destroyed late in the day on 9/11; some suspect this tank helps explains why. YORK TIMES, 12/20/2001 Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Office of Emergency Management, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, WTC Investigation June 9, 1999: Serbia Capitulates, Ending NATO Bombing Campaign Over Kosovo On June 9, 1999, NATO has been bombing Serbia for 78 days (see March 24, 1999). Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic capitulates, agreeing to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo. Kosovo technically remains part of Serbia (which is still called Yugoslavia) but it is essentially taken over by NATO. Within months, nearly 50,000 NATO peacekeeping troops occupy Kosovo, and the United Nations takes over its administration. POST, 9/19/1999 Entity Tags: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Slobodan Milosevic Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans Mid-June 1999: Hijackers Meet in Amsterdam and Get Saudi Cash Hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, plus would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and associate Mounir El Motassadeq, hold a meeting in Amsterdam, Netherlands. All are living in Hamburg at the time, so it is not clear why they go to meet there, though some speculate that they are meeting someone else. Motassadeq also goes to the town of Eindhoven, Netherlands, on three occasions, in early 1999, late 1999, and 2001. PRESS, 9/13/2002 On at least one occasion, Motassadeq receives cash provided by unnamed “Saudi financiers” that is meant to fund a new Eindhoven mosque. Investigators believe he uses the money to help pay for some 9/11 hijacker flying lessons. SUN, 9/2/2002 Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan Alshehhi, Mounir El Motassadeq Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Saudi Arabia June 24, 1999: CIA Director Gives Congress Secret Warning Bin Laden Planning Attacks in US CIA Director George Tenet tells a closed session of Congress, “We have seen numerous reports that bin Laden and his associates are planning terrorist attacks against US officials and facilities in a variety of locations, including in the US.” 2004, PP. 454 However, six months later and after a well-publicized attempted al-Qaeda attack on the Los Angeles airport (see December 14, 1999), he will not mention in an open session that bin Laden has the capability to stage attacks inside the US (see February 2, 2000). Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, US Congress, George J. Tenet Category Tags: Warning Signs, Millennium Bomb Plots